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As securities fraud has grown increasingly transnational,1 it has become 
necessary to expand the reach of anti-fraud provisions to persons and entities 
participating in global securities markets.2  So far, however, no single 
antifraud provision exists to govern the entire global marketplace.3  Although 
each country strives to combat international securities fraud by using its own 
regulatory regime, problems can develop when extraterritorial application of 
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 1. See Felice B. Friedman et al., Taking Stock of Information Sharing in Securities 
Enforcement Matters, 10 J. FIN. CRIME 37, 37 (2002) (pointing out the globalization of fraud). 
 2. See Kun Young Chang, Multinational Enforcement of U.S. Securities Laws: The Need 
for the Clear and Restrained Scope of Extraterritorial Subject-Matter Jurisdiction, 9 
FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 89, 90 (2003) (discussing regulatory issues arising from the 
globalization of securities fraud). 
 3. See id. 
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national securities laws leads to regulatory overlapping or conflicts.4  In light 
of these problems, it is necessary to set forth clear guidelines for determining 
whether national securities laws can apply extraterritorially and, if so, how 
far they can extend.5  The U.S., in particular, has longstanding and extensive 
experience in seeking extraterritorial application of national securities laws.6  
In doing so, the U.S. has developed several tests to justify extraterritoriality,7 
and has bolstered a statutory basis for extraterritorial application of anti-fraud 
prohibitions in actions brought by the U.S. Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) or the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ).8 
 
I.  EXTRATERRITORIALITY TESTS PRIOR TO THE DODD-FRANK ACT 
 
A. Extraterritoriality Tests Before Morrison: Effects and Conduct Tests 
 
Until abrogated by the U.S. Supreme Court’s decision in Morrison v. 
National Australia Bank Ltd. on June 24, 2010, the Second Circuit Court of 
Appeals had led the way in extraterritorial application of anti-fraud 
prohibitions by using two methods: the effects test and the conduct test.9  
Under the effects test, subject matter jurisdiction lay in a U.S. court when 
“the wrongful conduct had a substantial effect in the United States or upon 
United States citizens.”10  In Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, the Second Circuit 
introduced the effects test11 by holding that  
 
the district court has subject matter jurisdiction over 
violations of the Securities Exchange Act although the 
transactions which are alleged to violate the Act take place 
outside the United States, at least when the transactions 
                                                
 4. Id. at 90–92; see also INT’L BAR ASS’N, REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON 
EXTRATERRITORIAL JURISDICTION 6 (2009), available at http://www.ibanet.org/Document/ 
Default.aspx?DocumentUid=ECF39839-A217-4B3D-8106-DAB716B34F1E [hereinafter            
REPORT ON EXTRATERRITORIAL JURISDICTION]. 
 5. See Chang, supra note 2, at 94. 
 6. See, e.g., Schoenbaum v. Firstbrook, 405 F.2d 200 (2d Cir. 1968), abrogated by 
Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869 (2010); Leasco Data Processing Equip. 
Corp. v. Maxwell, 468 F.2d 1326 (2d Cir. 1972), abrogated by Morrison, 130 S. Ct. 2869; 
Dodd-Frank Wall Street & Consumer Protection Act, H.R. 4173, 111th Cong. §§ 929P(b), 
929Y (2010) (enacted) [hereinafter Dodd-Frank Act]. 
 7. See SEC v. Berger, 322 F.3d 187, 192–93 (2d Cir. 2003), abrogated by Morrison, 130 
S. Ct. 2869. 
 8. Dodd-Frank Act § 929P(b). 
 9. See Chang, supra note 2, at 95; see also Schoenbaum, 405 F.2d at 206; Leasco, 468 
F.2d at 1334. 
 10. Berger, 322 F.3d at 192–93; Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2879. 
 11. J. WILLIAM HICKS, INTERNATIONAL DIMENSIONS OF U.S. SECURITIES LAW § 11:29 
(2012). 
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involve stock registered and listed on a national securities  
exchange, and are detrimental to the interests of American 
investors.12   
 
In later cases, this court stipulated that the “effects” for the purpose of 
the effects test must be strong enough to generate “foreseeable and 
substantial harm to interests in the United States,”13 and also declared that 
mere adverse effects were insufficient to meet the requirements of the effects 
test.14  
Under the conduct test, by contrast, subject matter jurisdiction lay in a 
U.S. court so long as “the wrongful conduct occurred in the United States.”15  
Beginning with Leasco Data Processing Equipment Corp. v. Maxwell,16 the 
conduct test was used to close the loopholes of the effects test.17  Whereas 
the effects test focused on harm to U.S. investors or markets, the conduct test 
allowed a federal court to address where the fraudulent conduct occurred.18  
Accordingly, a U.S. court could obtain jurisdiction over foreign-related 
transactions that involved domestic misconduct even though the frauds did 
not harm U.S. investors or markets.19  To prevent the U.S. from being “used 
as a base for manufacturing fraudulent security devices for export, even 
when these [were] peddled only to foreigners,”20 the Second Circuit 
employed the conduct test, requiring that subject matter jurisdiction in the 
U.S. would depend on whether “substantial acts in furtherance of the fraud”21 
occurred on U.S. soil.22  The court then held that this conduct test would be 
satisfied when “(1) the defendant’s activities in the United States were more 
than ‘merely preparatory’ to a securities fraud conducted elsewhere, and (2) 
these activities or culpable failures to act within the United States ‘directly 
caused’ the claimed losses.”23  These two requirements had to be satisfied 
                                                
 12. Schoenbaum, 405 F.2d at 208. 
 13. Tamari v. Bache & Co. S.A.L., 730 F.2d 1103, 1108 (7th Cir. 1984). 
 14. Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc., 519 F.2d 974, 989 (2d Cir. 1975); see also Stephen 
Choi & Linda Silberman, Transnational Litigation and Global Securities Class-Action 
Lawsuits, 2009 WIS. L. REV. 465, 475–76 (2009). 
 15. Berger, 322 F.3d at 192–93; Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2879. 
 16. Leasco, 468 F.2d 1326. 
 17. HICKS, supra note 11, § 11:30. 
 18. Christine Jarmer, Comment, International Internet Securities Fraud and SEC 
Enforcement Efforts: An Update, 73 TUL. L. REV. 2121, 2132 (1999); see also Chang, supra 
note 2, at 95–96. 
 19. Chang, supra note 2, at 96. 
 20. IIT v. Vencap, Ltd., 519 F.2d 1001, 1017 (2d Cir. 1975). 
 21. Psimenos v. E.F. Hutton & Co., Inc., 722 F.2d 1041, 1045 (2d Cir. 1983) (citing IIT, 
519 F.2d at 1018); Berger, 322 F.3d at 193. 
 22. Psimenos, 722 F.2d at 1045; Berger, 322 F.3d at 193. 
 23. Itoba Ltd. v. Lep Group PLC, 54 F.3d 118, 122 (2d Cir. 1995) (citing Alfadda v. Fenn, 
935 F.2d 475, 478 (2d Cir. 1991)), abrogated by Morrison, 130 S. Ct. 2869. 
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even when the SEC, as a plaintiff, filed an action under the conduct test.24   
Although these two tests were independently developed, the court 
thought that they could be combined with each other.25  Indeed, the Second 
Circuit had used both tests “in a combined form.”26  The benefits of this form 
were demonstrated in Bersch v. Drexel Firestone, Inc.27  
Following these tests set by the Second Circuit, other circuit courts 
adopted similar extraterritoriality tests.28  The specific form of the tests, 
however, differed depending on the court in question.29  In particular, the 
D.C. Circuit used the strictest form of the conduct test, requiring that “the 
American-based conduct at issue had to itself constitute a securities law 
violation.”30  The Fifth and Seventh Circuits used a less strict form of the 
conduct test,31 requiring that the conduct on U.S. soil “directly [cause] the 
plaintiff’s alleged loss in that the conduct forms a substantial part of the 
alleged fraud and is material to its success.”32  The Third, Eighth, and Ninth 
Circuits, by contrast, used the most lenient form of the conduct test,33 
“requir[ing] only some activity designed to further a fraudulent scheme to 
occur in this country.”34  Under this last form, therefore, mere preparation 
may be sufficient to meet the requirements of the conduct test.35  Given the 
inconsistency among the courts in defining the required degree of domestic 
conduct, the conduct test could not function as a bright line in individual 
cases.36  Foreign market participants could not understand exactly what 
                                                
 24. See HICKS, supra note 11, § 11:41 (examining previous cases to see whether the two 
requirements of the conduct test should be met even when the SEC, as a plaintiff, brings a 
lawsuit).  In Berger, however, the Second Circuit acknowledged that, “in cases where the SEC 
[brought] suit prophylactically, it [would] be necessary to modify the conduct test to account 
for the fact that no harm or loss [had] occurred.”  Berger, 322 F.3d at 193, n.2. 
 25. HICKS, supra note 11, § 11:42. 
 26. Id. 
 27. 519 F.2d 974. 
 28. Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2880. 
 29. See THOMAS HAZEN, TREATIES ON THE LAW OF SECURITIES REGULATION, § 17.4[1] 
(2010), available at 1995 WL 1759427; see also Stephen Choi & Andrew Guzman, The 
Dangerous Extraterritoriality of American Securities Law, 17 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 207, 217 
(2009); HICKS, supra note 11, § 11:39. 
30.HICKS, supra note 11, § 11:39 (citing Zoelsch v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 824 F.2d 27, 31 
(D.C. Cir. 1987)). 
 31. Id. 
 32. Kauthar SDN BHD v. Sternberg, 149 F.3d 659, 667 (7th Cir. 1998), abrogated by 
Morrison, 130 S. Ct. 2869; HICKS, supra note 11, § 11:39. 
 33. HICKS, supra note 11, § 11:39. 
 34. Id.; SEC v. Kasser, 548 F.2d 109, 114 (3d Cir. 1977), abrogated by Morrison, 130 S. 
Ct. 2869; Choi & Guzman, supra note 29, at 217; HAZEN, supra note 29, § 17.4[1].  These 
courts addressed “whether the domestic conduct caused the plaintiff’s loss.”  HICKS, supra 
note 11, § 11:39. 
 35. Choi & Guzman, supra note 29, at 217. 
 36. See id. at 217–18; see also Chang, supra note 2, at 109. 
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circumstances put them under the jurisdiction of U.S. securities regulation.37   
Similar to the conduct test, the effects test also suffered from certain 
problems.38  In particular, it was vague as to what degree of “effects” must be 
made on the U.S. in order to meet the requirements of the effects test.39  
Thus, the specific extent of extraterritoriality under this test was left unsettled 
and unpredictable.40  Also, as internet networks had seen drastic 
improvement, overseas activities could unexpectedly impact U.S. markets or 
investors.41  Given these circumstances, the effects test risked expanding the 
scope of U.S. securities laws too far.42  Such unsettled and excessive 
expansion of national laws could infringe upon the sovereignty of other 
countries, and thus harm international relations.43 
 
B. Extraterritoriality Tests Under Morrison: Transactional Test 
 
Recognizing the concerns about the effects and conduct tests,44 in 2010 
the Supreme Court overruled the two tests set forth in Morrison v. National 
Australia Bank Ltd.45  The decision observed correctly that no explicit 
statutory basis existed for extraterritorial application.46  Yet, the Supreme 
Court went on to address the defects of the effects and conduct tests,47 and 
introduced a new test, the transactional test, as the primary standard to be 
used to determine the reach of Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act.48  
Specifically, focusing on the text of Section 10(b), the Court held that this 
provision applied to cases where fraudulent actions in question accompanied 
                                                
 37. See Choi & Guzman, supra note 29, at 217–18. 
 38. John Kelly, Note, Let There Be Fraud (Abroad): A Proposal for a New U.S. 
Jurisprudence with Regard to the Extraterritorial Application of the Anti-Fraud Provisions of 
the 1933 and 1934 Securities Acts, 28 LAW & POL’Y INT’L BUS. 477, 493 (1997). 
 39. Id.; Chang, supra note 2, at 110. 
 40. See Louise Corso, Note, Section 10(b) and Transnational Securities Fraud: A 
Legislative Proposal to Establish a Standard for Extraterritorial Subject Matter Jurisdiction, 
23 GEO. WASH. J. INT'L L. & ECON. 573, 576 (1989); see also Chang, supra note 2, at 109–10. 
 41. George Nnona, International Insider Trading: Reassessing the Propriety and 
Feasibility of the U.S. Regulatory Approach, 27 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 185, 198 (2001); 
Chang, supra note 2, at 109–10 & n.99. 
 42. See Chang, supra note 2, at 109–10. 
 43. See id. at 117–18; see also REPORT ON EXTRATERRITORIAL JURISDICTION, supra note 4, 
at 5 (stating that a sovereign state can enact legislation to regulate activities arising on its own 
soil). 
 44. See Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2879–81. 
 45. Morrison, 130 S. Ct. 2869; see also Letter from Hannah L. Buxbaum, Comments on 
Study on Extraterritorial Private Rights of Action Release No. 34-63174, File No. 4-617, 1 
(Feb. 18, 2011), available at http://www.sec.gov/comments/4-617/4617-14.pdf [hereinafter 
Comments by Buxbaum]. 
 46. Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2883. 
 47. Id. at 2879–81. 
 48. Id. at 2884. 
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“the purchase or sale of any security registered on a national securities 
exchange or any security not so registered.”49  Through this decision, the 
Court sought to remove ambiguity and provide clarity in determining the 
reach of Section 10(b).50 
In Morrison, Australian shareholders who had purchased stock on an 
Australian exchange filed a class action lawsuit against an Australian bank 
for violating sections 10(b) and 20(a) of the Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5.51  
The plaintiffs contended that the defendant made material misstatements 
regarding a mortgage servicing company it intended to acquire.52  In 
response, the district court dismissed this case for absence of subject matter 
jurisdiction, a decision the appellate court affirmed.53  Finally, the Supreme 
Court agreed with the lower courts’ dismissals,54 but rejected their 
underlying reasoning, specifically disputing their basis for deciding whether 
to grant extraterritorial applicability to U.S. securities laws.55  
Various foreign factors played a part in the Morrison case.  Most 
importantly, the parties involved were Australian—both the individual 
plaintiffs56 and the National Australia Bank Limited as defendant.57  The 
plaintiffs, in fact, had bought “ordinary shares”58 in this bank, and this stock 
was listed on foreign stock exchanges including the Australian Stock 
Exchange Limited.59  The case also displayed any number of domestic 
dimensions, including the conduct of a subsidiary in Florida and the listing of 
American Depositary Receipts (ADRs) on a U.S. exchange.60  In its 
reasoning, however, the Court held that the foreign dimensions of the case 
were those that were fundamental to it.61 
In deciding this case, the Supreme Court introduced significant changes 
in interpreting whether U.S. securities laws can apply extraterritorially.62  
First, the Court clarified the question of whether section 10(b) could apply 
extraterritorially, overturning the lower courts’ treatment of this question as 
                                                
 49. 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (2011); Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2884. 
 50. See Richard Painter, et al., When Courts and Congress Don’t Say What They Mean: 
Initial Reactions to Morrison v. National Australia Bank and to the Extraterritorial 
Jurisdiction Provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act, 20 MINN. J. INT’L L. 1, 6 (2011). 
 51. Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2873. 
 52. Id. at 2876. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. at 2888. 
 55. Id. at 2876–83, 2888. 
 56. Id. at 2876. 
 57. Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2875.  
 58. Id. at 2876. 
 59. Id. at 2875. 
 60. Id. at 2875, 2883–84. 
 61. Id. at 2884. 
 62. Id. at 2869. 
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an issue of subject matter jurisdiction.63  Upon deliberation, the Court 
declared that the extraterritoriality of section 10(b) was to be considered a 
matter of merits or prescriptive jurisdiction (i.e., whether the conduct fell 
within the scope of the statute), rather than one of subject matter 
jurisdiction.64  The Court’s decision left no doubt that U.S. federal courts 
have subject matter jurisdiction over Exchange Act claims regardless of an 
extraterritorial dimension.65  While examining the extraterritoriality of 
section 10(b), therefore, the federal courts had to determine whether that 
provision extended to the fraud that allegedly occurred (a matter of 
prescriptive jurisdiction) and not just whether the courts had authority to hear 
the case (a matter of subject matter jurisdiction).66  
Given this clarification, the Supreme Court’s substantive analysis of 
section 10(b) revealed that this provision did not extend beyond U.S. 
territory67 because of the text of the statute:  
 
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by 
the use of any means or instrumentality of interstate 
commerce or of the mails, or of any facility of any national 
securities exchange . . . [t]o use or employ, in connection 
with the purchase or sale of any security registered on a 
national securities exchange or any security not so 
registered, . . . any manipulative or deceptive device or 
contrivance in contravention of such rules and regulations as 
the [SEC] may prescribe . . . .68  
 
The Court then noted that it could not find any explicit provision allowing 
section 10(b) to apply extraterritorially.69  The Court thus concluded that 
section 10(b) did not extend extraterritorially.70 
In its reasoning, the Court indicated that the effects test and conduct test, 
as well as a combination of these two, were problematic because they did not 
rest on any firm ground, making it impossible to anticipate when U.S. 
antifraud provisions applied to a transaction.71  The Court then introduced the 
transactional test, which allows section 10(b) to apply to the case where the 
                                                
 63. Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2876–77. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. at 2877; see also Comments by Buxbaum, supra note 45, at 3–4; Painter, supra 
note 50, at 3. 
 66. Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2877; see also Comments by Buxbaum, supra note 45, at 3–4; 
Painter, supra note 50, at 3. 
 67. Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2883. 
 68. 15 U.S.C. 78j (2011); Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2881–82. 
 69. Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2883. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. at 2879–81. 
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fraudulent actions in question involve “transactions in securities listed on 
domestic exchanges, and domestic transactions in other securities.”72  
Through this test, the Court sought to provide clarity in deciding whether 
section 10(b) applies to overseas transactions.73  
Due to the language written in Morrison, however, the transactional test 
could be perceived as vague and confusing.74  The most significant problems 
with the transactional test arise from this specific wording: “transactions in 
securities listed on domestic exchanges, and domestic transactions in other 
securities.”75  Some people have interpreted this wording to mean that the 
location of a transaction is of no concern so long as the security is listed on a 
U.S. stock exchange.76  The Court, however, may not have intended such an 
interpretation, as the overall analysis in Morrison seemingly did not result in 
protecting foreign transactions;77 rather, the Court attempted to strictly limit 
extraterritorial application of section 10(b) unless an explicit statute 
providing extraterritoriality existed.78  Given this understanding, the literal 
interpretation of the transactional test may deviate from the plain intention of 
Justice Scalia and the majority.79  The appropriate interpretation, therefore, is 
that in Morrison the Supreme Court limited the applicability of section 10(b) 
to specific securities transactions that occur within the U.S.80  
Morrison’s transactional test would have imposed serious limitations on 
the SEC and the DOJ, in addition to private plaintiffs such as those suing in 
Morrison itself.81  For example, if a person steals insider information from an 
employer within the U.S. and then uses that information to trade securities 
outside the U.S., this person would not violate section 10(b) under the 
transactional test.82  In SEC v. Liang, a chemist obtained confidential 
                                                
 72. Id. at 2884.  In a post-Morrison case, the Second Circuit held that Morrison’s second 
prong, a “domestic transaction in other securities,” would be satisfied when “irrevocable 
liability was incurred or title was transferred within the United States.”  Absolute Activist 
Value Master Fund Ltd. v. Ficeto, 677 F.3d 60, 68 (2d Cir. 2012). 
 73. See Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2886; see also Painter, supra note 50, at 6. 
 74. See Painter, supra note 50, at 6–7. 
 75. Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2884; see also Painter, supra note 50, at 8. 
 76. See Comments by Buxbaum, supra note 45, at 1 (pointing out concerns about the 
potential arguments that might be made based on the language of Morrison). 
 77. Id. at 1–2 (quoting Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2882); see also Painter, supra note 50, at 9–
10; Comments by Forty-Two Law Professors, Comments on Study on Extraterritorial Private 
Rights of Action Release No. 34-63174, File No. 4-617, at 13 (Feb. 18, 2011), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/comments/4-617/4617-28.pdf [hereinafter Comments by Forty-Two Law 
Professors]. 
 78. See Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2883; Comments by Buxbaum, supra note 45, at 1. 
 79. Painter, supra note 50, at 9–10. 
 80. Comments by Buxbaum, supra note 45, at 1; Comments by Forty-Two Law 
Professors, supra note 77, at 13. 
 81. In his concurrence, Justice Stevens pointed out the defects of the transactional test.  
See Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2895 (Stevens, J., concurring). 
 82. Under the transactional test, “[s]ection 10(b) reaches the use of a manipulative or 
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information from the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA), and, based 
on that information, then traded stocks by using the accounts of Chinese 
residents.83  Fortunately for the U.S. government prosecutors, despite using 
foreign residents’ accounts, the chemist in this case performed his trading on 
the NASDAQ and NYSE Amex.84  If, however, this chemist were to have 
traded the stocks on a Chinese exchange, the transactional test would allow 
him to avoid liability for violating section 10(b).  A person or hedge fund 
manager who violates U.S. securities laws but is shrewd enough to execute 
his trading outside the U.S. is able to escape liability.  Such loopholes in the 
transactional test interfere with the government’s ability to prosecute actions 
that undermine market integrity and reduce investor confidence in the 
fairness of securities markets.  In order to partially close these loopholes, 
Congress enacted the Dodd-Frank Act and restored the effects and conduct 
tests in actions brought by the SEC and the DOJ.85 
   
II.  EXTRATERRITORIALITY TESTS UNDER THE DODD-FRANK ACT 
 
A. Extraterritoriality Provision of the Dodd-Frank Act 
 
In response to Morrison, Congress added a new provision in the Dodd-
Frank Act that had been pending in Congress for many months.86  In actions 
brought by the SEC and the DOJ, this provision establishes a statutory basis 
for extraterritorial application of the Exchange Act’s and Securities Act’s 
anti-fraud provisions.87  In particular, Section 929P of the Act allows the 
SEC and the DOJ to rely on the effects and conduct tests, stipulating that:   
 
(b) EXTRATERRITORIAL JURISDICTION.—The district 
courts of the United States and the United States courts of 
any Territory shall have jurisdiction of an action or 
proceeding brought or instituted by the Commission or the 
United States alleging a violation of the antifraud provisions 
of this title involving— 
                                                                                                               
deceptive device or contrivance only in connection with the purchase or sale of a security 
listed on an American stock exchange, and the purchase or sale of any other security in the 
United States.”  Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2888. 
 83. SEC v. Liang, Compl. 1–2, 8:11 CV 00819-RWT (Jun. 2, 2011), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/2011/comp21987.pdf [hereinafter Liang Complaint]; 
see also Liang, Litigation Release No. 22171 (Nov. 30, 2011), http://www.sec.gov/litigation/ 
litreleases/2011/lr22171.htm. 
 84. See Liang Complaint, supra note 83, at 5–9. 
 85. See Dodd-Frank Act § 929P(b); see also HICKS, supra note 11, § 11:50. 
 86. See Richard Painter, The Dodd-Frank Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Provision: Was It 
Effective, Needed or Sufficient?, 1 HARV. BUS. L. REV. 196, 199 (2011). 
 87. See Dodd-Frank Act § 929P(b). 
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(1) conduct within the United States that constitutes 
significant steps in furtherance of the violation, even if the 
securities transaction occurs outside the United States and 
involves only foreign investors; or 
(2) conduct occurring outside the United States that has a 
foreseeable substantial effect within the United States.88 
 
Congress enacted this extraterritoriality provision for the purpose of 
guaranteeing the robust police power of the SEC and the DOJ against 
offshore securities frauds.89  Regardless of Morrison, therefore, the SEC and 
the DOJ are once again able to rely on the effects and conduct tests in 
establishing extraterritorial securities fraud in violation of Rule 10b-5.90  In 
other words, they can file a lawsuit against perpetrators of multinational 
securities fraud on the ground of violating anti-fraud provisions so long as 
the effects or conduct test is met under Section 929P of the Dodd-Frank 
Act.91 
 
B. The Effects, Conduct, and Transactional Tests After the Dodd-Frank 
Enactment 
 
From the Morrison decision and Dodd-Frank enactment, it is clear that 
the SEC is equipped with several statutory grounds for extraterritorial 
application of U.S. anti-fraud provisions.92  One basis is the anti-fraud 
provisions themselves; in Morrison, the Supreme Court declared that the 
transactional test could be inferred directly from one of the anti-fraud 
provisions.93  Based on these provisions, then, the SEC can bring 
extraterritorial enforcement actions against a securities fraud that occurs in 
connection with U.S. securities transactions, even though the fraudulent 
scheme concerns overseas activities.94  
A second basis is Section 30 of the Exchange Act.95  This provision is 
designed to combat instances where a broker-dealer commits securities fraud 
on offshore markets in order to avoid U.S. securities regulation.96  Under this 
provision, the SEC can apply the Exchange Act to those who pursue their 
fraudulent scheme by committing “actions abroad that might conceal a 
domestic violation, or might cause what would otherwise be a domestic 
                                                
 88. Id. 
 89. See HICKS, supra note 11, § 11:50. 
 90. See id. 
 91. See Dodd-Frank Act § 929P(b). 
 92. See Painter, supra note 86, at 214–15. 
 93. See id. 
 94. See id. 
 95. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd (2006 & Supp. 2011); see also Painter, supra note 86, at 215. 
 96. Painter, supra note 86, at 215. 
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violation to escape on a technicality.”97  In order to use Section 30, however, 
the SEC would have to promulgate rules pursuant to this provision.98  With 
these in place, the SEC would be able to apply the Exchange Act’s antifraud 
provisions to certain overseas transactions, such as where a U.S. citizen uses 
a Canadian brokerage firm to buy stock listed only on a Canadian exchange 
and there are only nominal contacts between the brokerage firm and the 
U.S.99   
 
Figure 1.  





A third and final basis for extraterritorial application is Section 929P of 
the Dodd-Frank Act.100  Even if the facts of a foreign-related fraud do not 
meet the transactional test inferred from the antifraud provision, the SEC can 
bring enforcement actions against the perpetrator by using the effects or 
conduct test restored by the Dodd-Frank Act.101  In other words, the Dodd-
Frank Act allows the SEC’s enforcement powers to reach securities fraud 
that involves “conduct within the United States that constitutes significant 
steps in furtherance of the violation”102 or “conduct occurring outside the  
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 99. Beyea, supra note 98, at 572 (citing Kook v. Crang, 182 F. Supp. 388, 389 (S.D.N.Y. 
1960); see also Martin E. Goldman & Joseph L. Magrino, Jr., Some Foreign Aspects of 
Securities Regulation: Towards a Reevaluation of Section 30(b) of the Securities Exchange 
Act of 1934, 55 VA. L. REV. 1015, 1027 (1969). 
 100. Dodd-Frank Act § 929P(b). 
 101. See id.; see also HICKS, supra note 11, § 11:50. 
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Though the Dodd-Frank Act allows the SEC to keep using the effects 
and conduct tests, it is doubtful that the extraterritoriality provision of this 
Act can remove the ambiguity that existed before Morrison.104  This is 
primarily because Section 929P mirrors words used by appellate courts 
before Morrison.105  In particular, the meaning of the phrases “significant 
steps in furtherance of the violation”106 and “a foreseeable substantial 
effect”107 in Section 929P is unclear, and still left in the hands of courts.108  
Such ambiguity in the extraterritoriality provision can cause controversy in 
prospective cases, as it did before Morrison.109  It can also mislead the SEC 
to initiate enforcement actions in a case that displays only feeble U.S. 
interest,110 destroying international relations accordingly.111  The effects and 
conduct tests restored by the Dodd-Frank Act result in claims that overlap 
with those of other countries’ transactional tests, which remain more 
fundamental.  In Figure 2, the region designated “Overseas Transactions” 
demonstrates this risk. 
                                                
 103. Id. 
 104. Painter, supra note 86, at 212. 
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 106. Dodd-Frank Act § 929P(b). 
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 110. See id. at 216. 
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III.  HARMONIZING THE OVERLAPPING APPLICATIONS OF 
NATIONAL SECURITIES LAW 
 
When interpreting the effects and conduct tests under the Dodd-Frank 
Act, the SEC, the DOJ, and the federal courts may consult pre-Morrison 
decisions made by the courts of appeals.112  Before Morrison, the precise 
definitions of the effects and conduct tests were left unsettled.113  As a result, 
it was unclear exactly what circumstances put foreign market participants 
under the jurisdiction of U.S. securities regulation.114  Addressing this 
concern about the effects and conduct tests, in Morrison the Supreme Court 
overruled the Second Circuit’s use of these two tests.115  Congress, however, 
enacted a provision in the Dodd-Frank Act that allows the SEC and the DOJ 
to keep using these two tests for purposes of their own prosecutions.116  For 
this reason, even after Morrison and the Dodd-Frank enactment, the courts 
may examine how the Second Circuit interpreted the effects and conduct 
tests with respect to actions initiated by the SEC and the DOJ.117 
Even if courts apply the aforementioned interpretations to a post-
Morrison case, it still remains difficult to determine exactly when the effects 
and conduct tests should be applied.118  This is primarily because determining 
whether conduct occurs in the U.S. or when misconduct affects the U.S. 
depends on specific facts in a particular case.119  Such ambiguity in the 
extraterritoriality provision of the Dodd-Frank Act can sway the SEC and the 
DOJ to initiate enforcement actions in cases that prompt only negligible U.S. 
interest.120  
The SEC and the DOJ also face instances where the effects and conduct 
tests restored by the Dodd-Frank Act result in claims that overlap with the 
claims of other countries’ transactional tests, which remain more                                                
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note 2, at 110.  Each circuit also defined the form of the conduct test in different ways.  See 
HAZEN, supra note 29, § 17.4[1]; Choi & Guzman, supra note 29, at 217; HICKS, supra note 
11, § 11:39. 
 114. Choi & Guzman, supra note 29, at 218; Kelly, supra note 38, at 493; Chang, supra 
note 2, at 110. 
 115. Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2869; see also Comments by Buxbaum, supra note 45, at 1. 
 116. See HICKS, supra note 11, § 11:50. 
 117. Painter, supra note 86, at 209–10, 212 (stating that in order to interprete Section 929P 
of the Dodd-Frank Act, the courts may refer to some form of the effects and conduct tests 
created by the courts of appeals before Morrison). 
 118. Id. at 212. 
 119. See id.; see also Choi & Guzman, supra note 29, at 215–16. 
 120. See Painter, supra note 86, at 216. 
82 UNIVERSITY OF NEW HAMPSHIRE LAW REVIEW Vol. 12, No. 1 
fundamental.121  For example, in SEC v. McClellan,122 misappropriation of 
non-public information occurred within the U.S., but transactions of 
securities based on that information occurred outside the U.S.123  Arnold 
McClellan obtained non-public information while working at Deloitte Tax 
LLP and disclosed that information to his wife, Annabel McClellan, in the 
U.S.124  His wife then tipped off her affiliates, James Sanders and Miranda 
Sanders, who resided in the U.K.125  Since James Sanders traded derivatives 
based on the non-public information outside the U.S.,126 he has been more 
appropriately prosecuted in the U.K.127  Indeed, the SEC filed an 
enforcement action against only Arnold McClellan and Annabel 
McClellan,128 while the U.K. FSA brought legal actions against others, 
including James Sanders and Miranda Sanders.129  This sort of partitioning of 
enforcement helps prevent friction in the process, for if the SEC sought to 
prosecute not only U.S. insiders but also U.K. traders, jurisdictional conflicts 
might arise between the SEC and the FSA.130 
For this reason, the SEC and the DOJ should be careful in exercising 
their extraterritorial jurisdiction.  That the SEC and the DOJ can legally 
assert extraterritorial jurisdiction does not mean that they should always 
assert it, particularly when other countries have equal or greater claims to 
enforcement.  If the SEC and the DOJ aggressively, abusively, or unilaterally 
insist upon extraterritorial application of U.S. antifraud provisions under the 
Dodd-Frank Act, international relations can be significantly impaired.131  As 
a result, foreign authorities may become reluctant to provide cross-border 
cooperation, leading to frustration in investigating even multijurisdictional 
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cases that are predominantly related to the U.S.132  Indeed, being too 
aggressive and unilateral in enforcing U.S. securities laws outside the U.S. 
may cause foreign countries to be hostile to the U.S.133    
When, therefore, securities transactions occur abroad, the SEC and the 
DOJ should multilaterally consult with foreign authorities related to the case 
before seeking to apply U.S. antifraud provisions extraterritorially.134  Such a 
cooperative approach is necessary for countries to solve jurisdictional 
problems that arise when fighting international securities fraud.135  By 
unilaterally being more conservative about their extraterritorial enforcement, 
the SEC and the DOJ can reduce criticisms from other countries, but they 
cannot ultimately eliminate jurisdictional conflicts.136  This is mainly because 
other countries seeking extraterritorial enforcement can easily destroy 
jurisdictional stability that is unilaterally achieved.137  Furthermore, excessive 
unilateral restrictions can create regulatory loopholes for transnational 
securities fraud.138  For this reason, the SEC and the DOJ should bilaterally 
or multilaterally resolve the jurisdictional conflicts that arise in international 
securities enforcement.139  
In order to make this practice more common, the International 
Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSCO) should require each 
member regulator to consult with each other when faced with an 
extraterritoriality issue.  Furthermore, the IOSCO should promulgate a 
guideline showing how to cooperatively deal with jurisdictional overlapping.  
As shown in the International Bar Association’s report on extraterritorial 
jurisdiction, such a guideline should outline how to designate a lead regulator 
from among those of different countries, and then charge the lead regulator 
with conducting an investigation.140  
Through this cooperative approach, each country’s regulators can resolve 
the jurisdictional overlapping before it becomes controversial, and so the 
extraterritorial application of each country’s securities laws can be well 
harmonized.141  The regulators can also obtain assistance from other 
countries in an early stage of investigation, and thereby “avoid duplication of 
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information requests and interviews.”142  Finally, the regulators can 
effectively combat transnational securities fraud without allowing any 
regulatory loophole.143 
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